Comparatively Open: Statutory Information Disclosure for Consultation and Bargaining in Germany, France and the UK by Howard Gospel & P Willman
 
 
Comparatively Open:  Statutory Information 
Disclosure for Consultation and Bargaining 
in Germany, France, and the UK 
 
 








































Information provision is an important part of all mechanisms which give employees voice at 
work.  This paper considers the law on information disclosure for joint consultation and 
collective bargaining in three countries,  Germany, France, and the UK, chosen for their 
distinctive legal and institutional arrangements, within a common European Union context.  It 
is argued that there is coherence between the law and institutions in Germany; in France, 
despite extensive legal support for information provision, the law and institutions complement 
one another  less; in the UK, there are contradictory approaches and new dilemmas 
confronting the traditional system.    Although European Directives harmonise statutory 
minima, there are few signs of common disclosure practice emerging across the three 
countries. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Information is a basic resource in enterprise decision-making.  It is also essential for joint 
consultation, collective bargaining, and other mechanisms which give employees voice and 
regulate employment.  In practice, most information relevant to employee relations originates 
with the employer and there is a pervasive asymmetry of information between employer and 
employees.  Employees and their representatives will often seek information from the 
employer through consultation and in bargaining. The employer’s propensity voluntarily to 
disclose information in part depends on the perception of the balance of common goals as 
against distributive interests (Kleiner and Bouillon 1988; Morishima 1989 and 1991). 
  In most countries, company information is publicly available as a result of statute.  
Under company law, there are obligations on firms to disclose information in annual accounts 
and as part of reporting requirements.  Such information is often made available voluntarily 
to employees and used in wage bargaining by unions.  However, it is usually highly 
aggregated and historical.  Under individual employment law, in most countries, there are 
statutory obligations on employers to provide individuals with information on contracts of 
employment, health and safety, and pensions (Clark and Hall, 1992; Kenner, 1999). This may 
also extend to a more general ‘good faith’ obligation to provide individuals with reasonable 
information as part of their contracts of employment (Brody, 1998). 
  In some countries, notably the members of the European Union  (EU), additional 
collective labour law specifically addresses the informational asymmetry between employers 
and employees by detailing obligations to provide information to trade unions for collective 
bargaining or to works councils or other bodies for joint consultation. These arrangements are 
of two types – which we term process-driven and event-driven.   
  Where information disclosure is process-driven, the trigger for its use lies within a 
bargaining or consultation agenda.  The legislative approach to this tends to be a set of 
general rules on disclosure within a specified process such as a consultative or bargaining 
forum. The central purpose of such law is to enhance the operation of a process which itself 
may be either voluntary or mandated.  By contrast, where information disclosure is event-
driven, it is triggered by a specific employer-initiated event which affects employment 
contracts irrespective of the representative context – examples are changes of ownership or 
redundancy.  Here, the central purpose of the law is to create a temporary process around an 
employer-initiated event which has implication for terms of employment.  
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  The concern of process-driven disclosure is with a set of interlinked issues and with 
the vitality of the bargaining or consultative process; the concern of event-driven disclosure is 
primarily procedural justice in a specific context, such as the termination of employment 
contracts.  Process-driven disclosure assumes an on-going relationship and may enable 
employee representatives to take proactive measures.  Event-driven disclosure tends to 
operate more in a palliative rather than preventative way and need have no continuous impact 
on the relationship between employer and employees.  However, from the employee 
perspective, there is one major advantage of event-driven disclosure: it can exist in the 
absence of representation, which in most  countries has tended to shrink in scope and 
coverage.  In the EU, both types commonly coexist within national legal frameworks. 
  Here we examine the character of three national sets of disclosure requirements in the 
EU. The purpose is to understand how they are framed, to assess their comparative 
effectiveness, and to consider the likely impact in different countries of EU Directives which 
seek to harmonise practices across member states. 
  The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next three sections, legal arrangements 
for information disclosure are considered in three countries, Germany, France, and the UK, 
chosen because of their distinctive approaches, within a common EU context.  In part, the 
order reflects the historical timing of the development of law on disclosure in the three 
countries.  In part, it also reflects the extent of the law, the coherence between different laws, 
and the complementarity between legal and institutional arrangements.  In the final section, 




2.  Germany:  A Coherent System Under New Pressures 
 
In Germany, company information is disclosed primarily to employee representatives in the 
works council and on the supervisory board of the company.   Legislation was enacted on 
disclosure in the 1920s; it was re-introduced in 1952; since then there have been a number of 
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2.1  Works council representatives and their information rights  
 
The Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgetz or BetrVG) of 1952 (as amended in 
1972, 1988, and 2001) established the works council ( Betriebsrat), giving it important 
powers in social, personnel, and economic matters.  Under the law, at the workers’ request, a 
works council must be established in any company with at least five full-time employees.  Its 
duties are to represent employees, to see that their justified suggestions are implemented, and 
to ensure that laws and higher-level agreements are observed.  In the absence of such laws or 
agreements, the  Betriebsrat is entitled to conclude works agreements 
(Betriebsvereinbarungen) concerning various aspects of employment. 
  The BetrVG 87(1) lists the areas of competence of the Betriebsrat.  These include 
inter alia: working hours, wages and benefits, leave arrangements, monitoring of employees, 
health and safety, social facilities, standards governing pay systems, and principles governing 
suggestion schemes.  The works council must act ‘in a spirit of mutual trust’, whereby both 
sides agree ‘to refrain from activities which disturb operations or peace in the establishment.’ 
(BetrVG, 2 and 74-2). 
  To carry out its functions, the works council has extensive access to information: it 
shall be kept ‘fully and promptly’ informed and any documents which it requires shall be 
made available ‘on request at all times’( BetrVG, 80 (2)).  Confidentiality is not a reason for 
failing to inform the council (Daeubler, 1995).  To ensure that information is provided and 
can be used effectively, the Act and case law guarantee that access to information shall be in 
good time, which is defined as ‘sufficient time for suggestions and objections to be taken into 
account at the planning stage.’(BetrVG, 106;90)  The frequency of information exchange 
with the employer is legally mandated as monthly for both the Betriebsrat and its Economic 
Committee, to which annual accounts shall be explained.  At the request of the council, 
information flow and meetings may be more frequent.  In addition, when the workforce 
exceeds 1,000 employees, the employer shall directly inform employees in writing of the 
financial state and affairs of the undertaking at least once each quarter (BetrVG 74 (1) ). 
  To facilitate its activities, the works council has a number of supports.  Council 
members have the right to paid time-off for training and a number of works councillors can 
be released from normal duties.  Operating expenses must be met by the employer, who must 
make available premises, equipment, and secretarial support (BetrVG 37-38 and 40-41).  So 
as better to process information and to avoid overload, the council is entitled to form special 
committees.  The most influential of these is the Economic Committee, mandatory in all  
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undertakings employing over 100 employees.   Interpretation of information is facilitated 
through the right of recourse to experts and for the outside union to attend council meetings 
in an advisory capacity.  In the case of multi-plant and affiliated companies, where it is felt 
that the real information  and decision-making centre is beyond the reach of any one works 
council, a central council may be established by the resolution of individual works councils.  
The central council is composed of delegated members of the individual councils (BetrVG 28, 
31, 80 (3), 106, and 108 (4) and (5)). 
  If it considers that there is obstruction to its rights or where the parties cannot agree 
on the interpretation of information or a course of action, the council has recourse to a 
conciliation committee.  This consists of an equal number representing each side and is 
usually chaired by a non-voting labour court judge.  Employers prefer not to go to such a 
committee, in part because they pay for the proceedings, but more important because, in areas 
of co-determination, any  decision is legally binding and supersedes all other agreements 
between the employer and the council (BetrVG 76 and 87(2)).  There is thus strong pressure 
to reach an agreement.  The council has significant access to information and capability for 
processing it.  As will be described below, its links with the outside union are crucial to its 
capacity in this respect.  
  German workers also have representation on the supervisory board (Aufsicthsrat) of 
their companies, with proportions depending on type and size of company.  Meeting at least 
twice a year, its main functions are to elect the members of the management board (Vorstand) 
and to supervise its activities.  The legal rights of employee representatives are identical to 
shareholders’ representatives and they therefore have access to any information accessible to 
the Aufsichtsrat.  At the very least, this allows a direct monitoring of annual accounts and 
balance sheets.  At least once a year, the management board must supply the Aufsichtsrat 
with comprehensive information on all basic issues concerning the management of the 
enterprise.  In addition, at any time, any member of the Aufsichtrat can request additional 
information on affairs of importance for the enterprise.  However, a duty of confidentiality 
applies to all members of the Aufsichtsrat.  In practice, though the supervisory board in 
theory controls the management board, the latter is often very strong, not least because of its 
control over the flow of information.  In practice, in most companies, the works council is the 
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2.2  Special event disclosure and the minimal impact of the EU 
 
Below we will see that EU Directives and special event disclosure have had some effect on 
developing law and practice on information disclosure in France and an even greater effect in 
the UK.  By contrast, they have little impact on German law and practice.  In all three 
countries, we focus specifically on collective redundancies, transfer of undertakings and 
takeovers, and the impact of the European Works Council (EWC), all areas of major 
importance where there have been EU Directives. 
  In the case of collective redundancies, the works council has always had a significant 
role.  In firms with over 20 employees, the council has extended co-determination rights in 
the case of changes which may have ‘serious disadvantages’ for a substantial proportion of 
the workforce (BetrVG 111). 
  The labour court has specified that the works council  shall be called whenever 
redundancies affecting 10 per cent or more of the labour force are planned and that a special 
works agreement must be concluded between the employer and the council, following 
‘socially acceptable’ criteria for dismissals.  Where the council has not been consulted or 
where no agreement has been reached, the dismissals are without effect.  In practice, though 
most redundancies are accepted, this process affects the number and terms of redundancy  
(Standing and Tokman, 1991). 
  Despite the low number of hostile takeovers, there has been a growing concern about 
takeovers in Germany.  However, there is no specific legislation in this area governing 
disclosure to employees.  Yet, as described above, the legal rights of the works council and 
board representatives apply.  In practice, as in other countries, it is difficult to reconcile the 
right to information and the confidentiality inherent in such situations.  There are various 
problems - the secrecy rules imposed by national stock-exchanges, the danger of adverse 
market reactions given  the time needed to convene such a meeting, the content of the 
information to be provided, and the nature of any sanctions to be applied for non-disclosure.  
At the present time, the German government is considering a bill concerning takeover 
procedures, on the lines of the French model to be discussed below.   
  Though giving the possibility of creating EU-wide consultation institutions for 
German firms, the introduction of the EWC Directive has had a limited effect within 
Germany itself.  During the negotiations on the Directive, the German unions tried to 
preserve the ‘workers’ only’ composition of EWCs.  However, in the end, the Directive did  
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not align with the German definition.  German unions have been concerned about the 
possibility that use of EWCs may undermine the position of the domestic works council. 
 
2.3  Trade unions and information disclosure 
 
In Germany, there is no direct legal right for unions to receive company information for 
collective bargaining.  This reflects the tradition that unions operate outside the enterprise and 
bargain at multi-employer level, for a whole industry or part thereof.  Under multi-employer 
bargaining, information on any one company is of less relevance and the German legislature 
has never therefore seen fit to mandate information disclosure to unions.  However, unions 
have an exclusive prerogative on collective bargaining matters and works’ agreements cannot 
derogate from collective agreements negotiated by unions (BetrVG 77 (3)).  Workplace union 
delegates (Vertrauensleute) may be invited to attend meetings with the employer, but have no 
information rights. 
  In practice, however, German unions play a major role in the receipt and processing 
of company information.  First, they play an important role through the works council, and 79 
per cent of works council members are union members (Jacobi et al, 1992).  Moreover, at the 
request of members, the union has the legal right to be present at all council and Economic 
Committee meetings  (BetrVG 2).  In addition, the unions provide training and advice to 
Betriebsrat members.  Second, German unions also play an important role via the supervisory 
board.  Most board level representatives are also union members.  Moreover, full-time union 
officials may sit on supervisory boards as employee representatives, and this allows them 
direct access to company information, subject to the confidentiality requirements. 
  Summing up, German law requires that substantial information be provided in good 
time to worker representatives. The approach is largely process-driven and facilitates the 
development of an employee agenda.  However, there are challenges.  First, though EU 
requirements have not had a major impact on German practice, there has been fear that EU 
measures, for example EWCs, may undermine stronger German requirements.  Second, there 
are new fears concerning takeovers and some debate as to whether new legal requirements 
should be introduced to deal with these specific events.  Third, in recent years, employers 
have criticised the ‘straightjacket’ of collective agreements at industry level, and settlements 
have allowed for specific works agreements (negotiated by the works council) which permit a 
measure of flexibility on matters such as hours and work organisation.  These so-called 
opening clauses (Öffnungsklausen) constitute a new dynamic in the German system and allow  
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for more devolution to works councils.  As a result, some commentators speak of the German 
system ‘in crisis’ and speculate that works agreements may supplant collective bargaining 
with the union.  If decoupling were then to take place, this would have major consequences 
for the German system of information provision with its complementarity between works 
council consultation and union collective bargaining (Hanau, 2000). 
 
 
3.  France: Extensive Law but Blocked Institutions 
 
France has multiple mechanisms for information disclosure to employees.  In this respect, the 
legislature has been inventive and law has been built up in layers over time, reflecting critical 
political events.  The French approach has involved both process- and event-driven elements. 
 
3.1  The comité d’enterprise and its information rights 
 
In successive amendments to the Code du Travail (CdT), since 1945, the law has established 
and extended the rights of the  comité d’enterprise.  Such committees are mandated in 
companies with 50 or more employees.  As further amended in the early 1980s, the purpose 
of the committee is ‘to ensure expression of employees’ views and to allow their interests to 
be taken into account’  in decisions concerning a wide range of work, employment, and 
economic matters.  To this end, the committee is to be informed and consulted on matters 
relevant to the organisation, management, and general operation of the enterprise.  This 
obligation requires the employer to provide written information, in sufficient time to allow it 
to be considered.  In turn, the committee may formulate comments and questions which must 
be answered by management (CdT 420-1 - 426-1, 431-432).  
  Under the statute and case law, the comité d'entreprise has a right to be informed and 
consulted on broad aspects of pay and conditions, personnel policy, working time, work 
organisation, health and safety, and levels of employment.  It also has the right to be 
consulted on wider social consequences of significant decisions: important alterations in the 
structures of the enterprise, its economic organisation, and legal status; the evolution of R&D 
policy; mergers, acquisitions, and sales of significant parts of the company; and restructuring 
of the broader group to which the establishment belongs (CdT 431-4,432-4,432-11).  
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  To ensure that information is provided and can be processed effectively, the comité 
d'entreprise has legal supports similar to the German Betriebsrat.  Thus, the employer must 
make available facilities and allow time-off for training and involvement.  In order to carry 
out its duties, it is entitled to form special committees, such as health and safety committees 
(CdT 236).  Consideration of information is facilitated by the right of recourse to experts and 
provision for the presence of union delegates (delegués syndicaux) in an advisory capacity.  
In the case of multi-plant enterprises and holding companies, where decisions are made 
higher up in the organisation and where information received by any individual committee 
might be incomplete, a central committee may be established with related information rights.  
  The frequency of information exchange with the employer is legally mandated.  
Monthly, there should be a meeting of the comité d’enterprise, though extraordinary meetings 
may also be called in exceptional cases.  Quarterly, it must receive information covering the 
changing composition of employment, the state of orders and production schedules, and 
planned changes in plant, equipment, and production methods.  Annually, the employer must 
give a written report covering the following: the composition of the wage bill, the economic 
state of the enterprise, the value of production, and the flow of financial funds and their 
application.  In workplaces over 300 employees additional information concerning 
performance and capacity of the plant is required.   
  Under legislation passed in 1977, the information provided to the comité d'entreprise 
must include an annual workplace bilan social (CdT 438-5).  This summarises the position of 
the undertaking in the social area and must provide information on the following: 
employment, pay and benefits, health and safety, conditions of work, and the state of 
industrial relations. It must be endorsed and can be amended by the comité d'entreprise and 
must be made available to employees (CdT 438). 
  Thus, the French  comité d’enterprise has extensive legal rights to information.  
However, a number of limitations exist.  In contrast to Germany, the French  comité 
d'entreprise has managerial employees in membership and is chaired by the employer.  
Moreover, there are weaker links with unions which in turn have less capability and power 
than their German counterparts (Hege, 1998).  Though the unions have a monopoly right to 
present candidates in first-round committee elections, the fact that density has fallen to less 
than 9 per cent (ETUI, 1998), in part explains why the number of union candidates is 
shrinking.  Trade union members provide 56 per cent of committee members, as compared 
with 79 per cent in Germany.  On balance, this has meant that the French comité d'entreprise 
has been less able to obtain and use company information (Sellier, 1990, 1995; Hege, 1998,).   
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3.2  Further legislation and special event disclosure 
 
In addition to the legislation referred to above, in the area of collective redundancies, 
successive governments have seen fit to enact further measures.  From the mid-1970s to the 
mid-1980s amendments have been made to the Code du Travail mandating information and 
consultation in redundancy situations (Howell 1992; Jenkins 2000).  In addition, in 1989 and 
1993 legislation made it obligatory that firms must draw up a plan social.  This document 
must state the number of workers to be made redundant, their redundancy payments, training 
schemes, and possible relocation elsewhere in the company.  If the comité d'entreprise feels 
that information provided in the social plan is inadequate, it may ask a tribunal to halt the 
dismissal procedure and require the production of a new plan.  A number of important cases, 
involving firms such as Crédit du Nord, IBM France, La Samaritaine, and Michelin, have 
interpreted the law favourably for employees but also stimulated demands for further 
legislation (Bledniak 1999; Jenkins 2000: 133-41) 
  In the case of takeovers or a change in control via the transfer of shares, judicial 
decisions have interpreted the Code du Travail to mean that an employer must inform and 
consult on the employment consequences of these matters.  In addition, further legislation in 
1989 stipulated that as soon as a target-company becomes aware of a takeover bid, it must 
inform the comité d’enterprise.  The latter may then decide to invite the bidding party to 
present its case, outlining any possible effects on employment (CdT 432-1).  However, in 
practice, successful legal challenges in the case of takeovers have been limited.  One major 
problem here is that stock exchange confidentiality rules conflict with legislation on 
information to the comité d’enterprises (Commission des Operations de Bourse, 1998).   
 
3.3  The role of trade unions and collective bargaining 
 
In the case of trade union collective bargaining, there were traditionally no statutory rights to 
information.  Indeed, unions have had the legal right to operate in the firm only since 1968.  
Since then delegués syndicaux may be appointed according to the size of the workforce and 
have the right to facilities and time-off for the performance of duties and protections against 
dismissal (CdT 132-2,412-6,412-20,451  As in Germany, French unions have a monopoly on 
collective bargaining, and, for a collective agreement to be valid, it can only be concluded 
with a union.  Moreover, where a union branch exists, it is illegal for an employer to conclude 
a works agreement with a comité d'entreprise (Bledniak, 2000).  Any union affiliated to one  
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of the five representative confederations has the right to conclude collective agreements or 
works agreements for all employees - including for non-unionised workers.   
  The 1982 Auroux laws, introduced by the Mitterrand government, had a number of 
somewhat contradictory purposes.  One was to introduce a right of expression for employees.  
A further purpose was to encourage collective bargaining.  I n the latter respect, the law 
introduced an obligation on employers to conduct negotiation every year at the establishment 
level on working hours and work organisation and every five years at the industry level on 
job classification.  The bargaining parties were encouraged to agree upon necessary 
information to be disclosed (CdT 132-27).  In practice, the legislation had a positive effect on 
the number of collective agreements at both national and enterprise level.  However, the 
unions had difficulty in leading in plant-level negotiations and in practice employers often 
chose to enhance the position of either the  comité d’enterprise or the direct expression 
bodies.  The same thing has occurred with the 1998 legislation on the 35 week which also 
stimulated negotiations both with unions and comités d’enterprise and enhanced the flow of 
information to employees.  However, again, simultaneously employers have in many 
instances been able to divide the comité d’enterprise from the union. 
  Notwithstanding, French unions have an indirect access to information through the 
comité d’enterprise.where they can be invited to assist and advise at meetings.  Also, as in 
Germany, union influence extends through the training and expertise they provide to the 
comité d'entreprise.  Union delegates must by law be invited to assist and advise the comité 
d’entreprise in all meetings with the employer.  They receive information provided to 
committee representatives, including the annual bilan social, and they must be informed 
about training matters.  Under the Auroux laws on the direct expression of employees, every 
three years, union delegates have the right to give an opinion on the results of employees’ 
expression rights, and their amended report is forwarded to the Labour Inspector (CdT 438-
5).  In multi-plant companies, the law protects the right of every representative union to 
appoint a ‘central union delegate’ which allows a union presence at the level to the central 
comité d'entreprise (CdT 412-12). 
  In sum, the abundance and inventiveness of French statutes relating to information 
disclosure is striking.  As it stands, French law provides substantial information to the comité 
d’enterprise.  It also enjoins information provision via the  bilan social and the right of 
expression.  It provides some information directly to trade unions and some indirectly to them 
via the participation of union delegates in the comité d’enterprise.  The approach is one 
which is largely process-driven, though there is also some event-driven disclosure.  However,  
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the institutions which might use the law are weak and have difficulty developing effective 




4.  The UK:  Towards Europe? 
 
In the UK, the legal obligation on employers to provide information to employee 
representatives had its origins in the early 1970s, later than in Germany and France.  At that 
time, the emphasis was on disclosure for collective bargaining, and, despite the changes of 
the Conservative years (1979-97), the legislation survived.  In the 1980s and 1990s, there was 
a new emphasis on disclosure as part of joint consultation at work reflecting both  growing 
EU influence and the preference of Conservative governments and many employers for 
consultation over bargaining.  The Labour government elected in 1997 introduced new trade 
union recognition law and adopted European social policy, including EWCs.  It has also 
passed amendments to existing legislation on collective redundancies and transfer of 
undertakings, all of which contain event-driven disclosure provisions and extended the right 
to information disclosure for collective bargaining to the area of training  (Employment 
Relations Act (ERA), 1999, s. 5).  The government has also encouraged the development of 
so-called ‘partnership’ agreements between employers and unions that are also posited on a 
greater sharing of information  (ERA, s. 30).  More recently and albeit reluctantly, the 
government has accepted the EU Directive on Information and Consultation rights in national 
level undertakings (DTI, 2002; Gospel and Willman, 2003) 
 
4.1.  Disclosure for collective bargaining 
 
Since 1976, employers have been obliged to disclose information, (a) without which a union 
would be materially impeded  in collective bargaining and (b) which it would be in 
accordance with good industrial relations practice to disclose.  Bargaining must be about 
matters for which the union is already recognised.  Moreover, the employer specifically does 
not have to provide the following: information supplied in confidence or which would cause 
substantial injury to the firm; information which would involve a disproportionate amount of 
work in its compilation; and original documents other than ones specifically prepared for the  
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purpose of providing the information (Gospel and Willman, 1981).  If a union feels that an 
employer has failed to meet the statutory requirements, and after an attempt at conciliation by 
Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS), the Central Arbitration Committee 
(CAC) may make an award specifying information to be provided.   If the employer still 
refuses to disclose, the CAC may award improvements in terms and conditions of relevant 
employees.  A Code of Practice lists items which might be relevant to collective bargaining, 
under the headings of pay and benefits, conditions of service, and performance and financial 
matters.  A further list contains items which might cause substantial injury to the employer, 
such as cost schedules, price quotes, and details of proposed investments (ACAS 1977).   
  In the early years, there was an initial union enthusiasm for the procedure; thereafter 
the number of cases fell and remained low through the 1980s; subsequently they have 
fluctuated considerably from the early 1990s onwards.  However, over the whole period there 
have been only about twenty complaints to the CAC each year and only two or three formal 
awards per year.  The downward fluctuation reflects a number of factors.  On the one hand, 
the decline a fter the early years might have reflected the indirect influence of the legal 
provisions on voluntary practice (Millward et al, 1992, p123-4).  On the other hand, the later 
decline in usage also reflected disappointment with the provisions.  A temporary increase in 
cases in the early 1990s might have reflected a pragmatic adjustment on the part of unions to 
the difficulties of the Thatcher years.  The upward trend also seemed to have reflected a 
response from unions to the growing decentralization of business activities, effects of 
privatisation and outsourcing, and individualization of employment relations (Gospel and 
Lockwood, 1999). 
  Overall, around half of union complaints have been held to be well founded.  
Complaints are more likely to yield information on terms and conditions of the represented 
group and on labour costs and human resource budgeting; they are least likely to yield 
information on terms and conditions of other groups within the same organisation and on 
financial matters and the overall state of the organization.  The most successful employer 
objection to information provision has been that the information did not concern a matter 
subject to collective bargaining and that collective bargaining would not be materially 
impeded by non-disclosure.  In addition, it is often claimed that the information had been 
supplied to the employer in confidence (Gospel and Lockwood, 1999). 
  The tests under the law are very restrictive.  As noted, disclosure is limited to matters 
for which the union is recognized (TULRCA s. 181 (1); CAC Award 8065).  The test of 
‘good industrial relations’ practice is vague, and the CAC has never acted as a trail-blazer.   
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The test of material impediment has also proved a major obstacle to unions which have 
previously managed without such information.  Timing is a problem; the CAC may only 
adjudicate upon a past failure to disclose and may not declare what information should be 
provided in the future.  Finally, the enforcement mechanism is weak since the sanction 
neither forces disclosure nor provides for a punitive award.   
 
4.2  Event-driven disclosure 
 
More recent UK disclosure legislation has been event-driven and relates more to joint 
consultation than to collective bargaining.  In response to EU Directives since the mid-1970s, 
employers have been obliged to disclose information to recognized unions and employee 
representatives in the event both of redundancies and business transfers.  In both cases, the 
original law was amended in response to a 1994 European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision 
that the UK had failed properly to implement the Directives in that the right was only 
available to recognized unions.  As a result of continuing criticisms, in 1999, the Labour 
government introduced further regulations which give primacy to a trade union where such 
exists, but which also provide for other representatives in non-union situations (Gospel et al, 
2003). 
  Where it is proposed to make 20 or more persons redundant, the employer must not 
dismiss an employee without first consulting with either a recognized trade union or 
employee representatives elected in advance or  ad hoc for the particular purpose.  The 
information to be disclosed must cover the following: reasons for the redundancies, the 
methods of selection and implementation, and the calculation of redundancy payments.  The 
employer must give a reasoned reply in ‘good time’ to any representations by employees.  
Where there are ‘special circumstances’ preventing compliance, the employer must 
nevertheless take steps which are feasible in the circumstances.  If an employer fails to 
disclose and consult, the affected employees (but not the union) can present a collective 
complaint to an industrial tribunal for a financial settlement  (TULRCA, 188(4), (7), and 
89(4)). 
  In relation to business transfers, the employer must provide information on the 
following matters: the reasons for the transfer and its timing, implications for employees 
concerned, measures the employer might take in relation to affected employees, and measures 
which the transferor envisages the transferee might take (TUPE, 1981; 10).  The employer is 
placed under a duty to inform, but there is not always an obligation to consult.  The duty to  
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furnish information is activated when a transfer is proposed.  The duty to consult arises where 
an employer envisages ‘measures’ which will be taken in relation to any affected employees.  
In these circumstances, the employer has to consult appropriate representatives ‘with a view 
to reaching agreement’.  As with the redundancy provisions, if there are special 
circumstances, rendering it impracticable to disclose, the employer has to take such steps as 
are reasonably feasible  (TUPE, 1981; 10 (5) and  (7)).  If an employer fails in these 
obligations, the affected employees (but again not the union) can present a complaint to an 
industrial tribunal which can award a financial settlement. 
  These event-driven provisions have several limitations.  First, by their nature they do 
not allow for linkages to be made with other information, which might be germane to the 
prior business decision.  Second, the obligation is to consult ‘in good time’ and not at the 
earliest opportunity.  As a result, union complaints have often been that information provided 
by employers is too late.  Third, the emphasis  is placed on procedural justice for the 
individual, not collective entitlement claimed through a trade union.  Consequently, the 
redress is for the individual.  Fourth, business transfers are not deemed to occur if there is a 
sale or transfer of shares, on the grounds that the employer remains unchanged.  This is a real 
limitation since economic control may have changed and this may have important 
implications for employees.  Finally, the obligation to inform and consult only applies to the 
measures which the employer envisages will be taken.  If no measures are proposed, then no 
information or consultation is required.  In addition, for the need to consult to arise, the 
employer must have formulated a definite plan or proposal on which it is intended to act as 
opposed to mere forecasts.  Furthermore the obligation to consult is restricted to the subject 
matter of the proposed measures.  In practice, in a developing situation, measures might only 
be envisaged at a late stage.  In this situation, if there is i nsufficient time for effective 
consultations to take place before the transfer, the employer could not be criticized (IPCS v 
Secretary of State for Defence (1987) IRLR, 373). 
  Following the Labour governments’ acceptance of the Social Chapter, the EWC 
Directive was introduced in the UK. Under the Directive, management must draw up a report 
and meet at least once a year with the EWC to provide relevant information and to consult. 
The information disclosed must relate to the following: the economic and financial situation 
of the business; the likely evolution of the business, production, and sales; trends in 
investments and employment; substantial changes in organisation, working methods, 
transfers of production, mergers, or retrenchment; and collective redundancies.  In addition, 
in exceptional circumstances, such as a plant closure, there must be an extra ad hoc meeting  
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for information and consultation as soon as is possible.  Redress for failure to inform and 
consult an EWC takes the form of a financial penalty. 
  The EWC Directive represented a reversion in the UK to a more process-driven 
approach and in multinational companies has also provided a possible vehicle for unions to 
raise concerns and generate a management response.  In practice, however, the information 
and consultation provisions are fairly limited, requiring only one annual meeting and the 
presentation of highly aggregate information in a special report.  Moreover, management may 
withhold information which might be prejudicial to the enterprise.  In practice, activities are 
often dominated by management, and employee representatives often feel they cannot 
seriously participate in decision-making (IRS 1998). 
 
4.3  The UK:  plus ca change?  
 
The recent passage of the EU Directive on Information and Consultation in national level 
undertakings has introduced into the UK another process-driven procedure which is likely to 
be highly influential.  he Directive will affect large enterprises (over 150 employees) by early 
2005 and cover all undertakings with more than 50 employees by 2008, thus covering about 
75% of the UK labour force. In the Directive, consultation is defined as an ‘exchange of 
views and the establishment of dialogue’ (Article 2) - implying an ongoing process. Article 4 
(2) outlines the substantive areas: there is an obligation  (a) to provide information on the 
general business situation of the undertaking; and (b) to inform and consult on the likely 
development of employment and on ‘anticipatory measures’ which might threaten 
employment; and (c) there is an enhanced obligation to inform and consult on decisions likely 
to lead to substantial changes in work organization or in contractual relations.  On item (c), 
consultation shall be ‘with a view to reaching an agreement’ (Article 4)  - implying  an 
ongoing process of give-and-take.  These are minimum mandatory topics and other matters 
can be covered. Consultation must take place at an ‘appropriate’ time and so as to enable 
employee representatives to prepare for consultation. It shall also be ‘at the relevant level of 
management and representation depending on the subject under discussion’ - implying that 
there should be different levels of representation and consultation within an undertaking.  In 
all cases, management is obliged to provide a reasoned response to representatives’ opinions. 
Representatives are also to be given adequate ‘protection and guarantees’ to enable them to 
perform their duties (Article 7).  On matters of confidentiality, information may be withheld 
which the employer considers would seriously damage the undertaking, and representatives  
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and ‘any experts who assist them’ may be made subject to an obligation of confidentiality. 
Sanctions for failure to comply shall be ‘effective, proportionate, and dissuasive’ (Article 8).  
Employers and employee representatives may negotiate different arrangements before and 
after transposition - but these would have to respect the principles of the Directive (Article 5). 
  Current plans for the transposition of the Directive into UK law (DTI, 2003) conform 
to two broad and related principles which have long characterised the UK – voluntarism and 
adaptability to pre-existing institutions.  The proposal is for a triggering process allowing 
employees to request information and consultation arrangements or, where such exist, to 
question whether they comply with the Directive. 
  Employees are allowed to request negotiations with their employer on the 
establishment of information and consultation procedures.  The request must be made by at 
least 10 per cent of the employees in the undertaking, subject to a minimum of 15 employees 
and a maximum of 2,500.    If successful, the employer will be obliged to enter into 
negotiations with elected employee representatives to reach an agreement on information and 
consultation arrangements within the undertaking. 
  However, if such an agreement is in place and the request for a new one has been 
made by fewer than 40 per cent of the workforce, the employer may, instead of opening 
negotiations, hold a ballot of all the employees to ascertain whether the request is endorsed 
by at least 40 per cent of the workforce.    Where it is, the employer must enter into 
negotiations on a new agreement.  Where employers indicate their intention to hold a ballot 
on a pre-existing agreement, an employee representative or employee (where there are no 
employee representatives) may complain to the CAC if they dispute that the claimed 
agreement satisfies the conditions above.  Where the CAC finds the complaint well-founded, 
it will order the employer to enter into negotiations instead of holding a ballot.  Pre-existing 
agreements may not consist of arrangements unilaterally imposed by management without 
any discussion with employees and where employees have had no opportunity to signify their 
approval. 
  A key element here is that employers must make arrangements for employees to 
appoint or elect negotiating representatives.  Negotiated agreements must be in writing, cover 
all the employees in the undertaking, and set out the circumstances in which the employer 
must inform and consult the employees.  Moreover, agreements must either provide for the 
appointment or election of  ‘information and consultation representatives’ who will be 
informed and consulted by the employer or provide that the employer will inform and consult 
the employees of the undertaking directly.  Agreements must be signed either by all the  
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negotiating representatives or by a majority of them, in which case the agreement must also 
be approved in writing by at least 50 per cent of the employees or approved by 50 per cent of 
employees who vote in a ballot. 
  Where no agreement is reached within the six-month time limit or any agreed 
extended period, the fall-back is the application of the ‘standard information and consultation 
provisions’ which in effect copy over the requirements of Article 4 of the Directive. The 
employer is required to arrange for a secret ballot to elect one information and consultation 
representative for every 50 employees or part thereof, up to a maximum of 25.  The employer 
will then be required to provide information on the following:   the recent and probable 
development of the undertaking’s activities and economic situation; the situation, structure 
and probable development of employment within the undertaking a nd any anticipatory 
measures which might affect employment; and decisions likely to lead to substantial changes 
in work organisation or in contractual relations, including decisions covered by the legislation 
on collective redundancies and transfers of undertakings. 
  Enforcement is to be via the CAC, with the penalty being a fine on the employer for 
non-compliance.    The employer is protected by a right of confidentiality on information 
disclosed to representatives and may withhold documents which might cause serious harm to 
the undertaking.  Information and consultation representatives are entitled to reasonable paid 
time off to perform their functions, enforceable through employment tribunal claims. 
Employees are also protected against unfair dismissal or detriment by an employer when 
acting as representatives or otherwise exercising their rights under the proposed legislation 
(Hall, 2003).  
  This is the first time that the UK’s strategy for implementing an EU Directive has 
been agreed in tripartite discussions between the government, the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI), and the Trades Union Congress (TUC).  In the negotiations, the CBI’s main 
objective was to protect existing company arrangements, whereas the TUC argued that 
arrangements that are not based on genuine agreement with the workforce must be capable of 
being challenged.  In effect, the overall intent of the Regulations is a kind of legislatively-
induced voluntarism, similar to the statutory trade union recognition procedure, with the new 
legislation driving the spread of voluntary information and consultation agreements, reached 
either ahead of its entry into force or as a consequence of its trigger mechanism being used. 
  One key concern is the reliance on employee representatives, which is central to the 
Directive, but fudged in the UK regulations. Many firms in the UK rely on direct 
communication with employees (Millward et al, 2000). The entire framing of the discussion  
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documents has focused on the positive impact of information provision and consultation on 
firm performance.  On one interpretation, the UK Regulations imply that direct 
communication arrangements will satisfy the requirements of the Directive.  If this is the 
case, unions, interested in extending employee representation, are likely test this at the ECJ 
and cause continuing tension and uncertainty in UK law in this area. 
  In conclusion, therefore, the UK began with process-driven disclosure based 
exclusively on collective bargaining.  Primarily under the influence of EU Directives, event-
driven disclosure and consultation were later introduced.  With the EWC and the Information 
and Consultation Directive, there has been a reversion to process-driven disclosure, but based 




5.  Conclusions 
 
We argued in the introduction that information is a basic resource in enterprise decision-
making.  It is essential for all mechanisms which give employees voice and regulate 
employment relations.  Though employers have an incentive to disclose some information to 
employees, informational asymmetry is pervasive in the employment relationship.  In the 
legislation discussed above, this is indeed the assumption of national legislators, and the laws 
are posited on a belief that an adequate and timely flow of information will make consultation 
and negotiation more meaningful.   
  Given informational asymmetry and employer reluctance to disclose, there is a role 
for the law.  The three different legal approaches to information disclosure reflect deep 
patterns of industrial relations and corporate governance in each country.  The German 
arrangements reflect a system which values and promotes cooperative relations between 
stakeholders in an insider system of governance. Here, information disclosure is essential for 
the creation of trust and encourages an employee collective agenda (Teubner, 1998).  In 
France, the law reflects a history of employer reluctance to disclose, especially to trade 
unions, in a situation where labour has never been an insider in governance and where there 
is less trust between the parties.  At critical political points, governments have intervened to 
mandate disclosure and consultation in an attempt to give employees rights and to ease social 
tensions.  However, the law has often been ineffective or had unintended consequences.  In  
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particular, employers have tried to turn disclosure to their advantage and to the disadvantage 
of trade unions.  In the UK, the traditional approach was to privilege adversarial collective 
bargaining in a market system of governance and a voluntaristic setting.  Disclosure 
legislation was originally introduced to facilitate union bargaining agendas.  It was always 
limited and its effective scope shrank w ith collective bargaining.  More recently, EU 
membership added two new dimensions: first, a different concept of event-driven disclosure 
for the resolution of specific problems, the establishment of individual rights, and the 
promotion of cooperative relations; and, second, legal rights for the establishment of process-
driven works council-type joint consultation arrangements.  In the British case, these different 
approaches sit uncomfortably together.  
  Legal supports and guarantees do effect information provision.  Thus, in Germany, 
disclosure rights for the works council give employee representatives good access to 
information, supplemented by information provided to employee representatives on company 
boards.  The union plays a significant indirect role in information processing.  In France, the 
legislature has tried repeatedly to make employers provide more information, especially for 
joint consultation.  Such repetition itself suggests that these legal measures have had less 
effect on French disclosure practice.  In the UK, in the area of collective bargaining, the 
effect of process driven legislation has been very limited. On the borderline between 
collective bargaining and joint consultation, newer event-driven legislation has had some, 
though to-date limited, impact. 
  There are also differences in the coherence of the law. In Germany, there exists an 
interlocking system which had its origins after the war.  By comparison with France and the 
UK, a system has been created which has proved to be coherent and complementary in its 
parts.  Thus there has been little felt need in Germany to change the law on information 
disclosure by the addition of new requirements of an event-driven kind.  By contrast, in 
France, layers of law have built up in a less coherent manner, reflecting a periodic desire by 
the legislature to develop consultative and bargaining institutions at the workplace and to 
create a more effective industrial relations system.  The result is a set of laws which co-exist 
without reinforcing each  another.  In the UK, the law has developed under two different 
influences – collective laissez-faire and, more recently, the principle of procedural justice for 
individuals initiated by EU Directive. The latter is likely to lead to major changes. 
  In practice, it would seem that disclosure for collective bargaining and for joint 
consultation are more likely to be additive where unions are already strong and can play a 
significant role in workplace regulation.  The usefulness of the law depends on the existence  
  20 
of institutions which can use it.  Germany is an example in this respect, with a close 
relationship between the works council, board representatives, and the trade union in 
information receipt and processing.  In France, where unions are weaker and have less 
effective ties with workplace bodies, the coherence between the law and institutional 
arrangements is less strong.  As a result, periodically, the legislature has sought to intervene 
to promote greater coherence.  In the UK, to date, there has been some confusion, but, with 
the passage of the new legislation, the UK will clearly move down the road to dual channels 
of representation via trade unions and works councils.   
  A final comment concerns the impact of EU Directives.  The processes by which they 
are translated into national law guarantees the maintenance of national diversity in 
institutions at the expense of convergence of standards.  This is true of our three countries 
and seems likely to hold for the foreseeable future.  Thus, EU Directives guarantee a floor of 
information and consultation rights for employees while maintaining deep national 
differences. 
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